"Verified voting" refers to auditing the results of an election to determine if the votes counted by electronic voting machines were cast accurately and counted properly. It should more accurately be called "verifiable" voting, because current limitations to electronic voting machines in many states (including New Jersey) result in there being no independent way of verifying the outcome of an election.

The commonest form of verification is a paper record of each vote; the voter can consult the document to verify that the vote he or she cast was recorded accurately and the stored document also has legal standing as an official ballot and may be used in recounts should the vote count be challenged.

In addition, verified voting should also include random audits at some percentage of the polling places to ensure that no unknown technical mishap or other form of mischief is taking place.

The issue of verified voting is a consequence of the development of electronic voting machines. The current versions of these machines provide no means for recounting votes. In addition, they have been found by independent tests to be subject to security flaws and errors. This means there is the potential for machines to fail in the way that your home PC or mine might do, as well as for unscrupulous persons to alter the results of elections.

New Jersey Congressman Rush Holt (12th Congressional District) has presented HR 550, titled "The Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act", to Congress as a means of taking the first step to initiate true verifiable voting. The bill is currently referred to the House Administration Committee.

On the state level, New Jersey has passed bill A33, which "Requires that voting machines produce voter-verified paper record; provides that results of audit become official tally; provides for waiver if paper record not commercially available; provides for State funding for paper record." For additional information on A33, go here and search for the bill by number (A33).

Note that A33 also contains a provision that states that counties may apply for waivers if they are unable to implement the paper audit trail requirement by the 1/1/08 due date because such functionality is not "commercially" available. This should be an enormous red flag to all: Sequoia Pacific, the maker of the voting machine in use in 90% of New Jersey counties, has the state under contractual "trade secret" prohibition against examination of its voting systems' operating software. If others cannot examine the software, they probably cannot develop peripherals to produce the printed record. If Sequoia won't do it, and no one else is allowed to, New Jersey counties may be without this fundamental measure of voting security for some time to come.

Public comment on the developing standards for the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (not receipt) are currently invited on the State Division of Elections page at the NJ Attorney General's website. Take a look, and share your thoughts.

The Black Box Voting web site provides a great deal of information on the problems and issues with the current generation of electronic voting machines.